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PARTNERSHIP IN THE EU EXTERNAL MIGRATION POLICY
Teresa RUSSO1
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS CONCERNING THE PARTNERSHIP 
INSTRUMENT – II. THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF EU MIGRATION 
POLICY AND THE “PARTNERSHIP APPROACH” – III. THE MOBILITY 
PARTNERSHIP: LEGAL FORM AND CONTENTS – IV. THE PRIORITY GIVEN 
TO THE AFRICAN AND MEDITERRANEAN AREA – V. CONCLUSIONS: 
WHAT RESULTS?
ABSTRACT: The present work intends to highlight the most relevant aspects of the choices of the 
EU’s external migration policy through the instrument of Mobility Partnership which was proposed 
as general framework for the management of migration fl ows from third countries. Its main aim 
was to take due account of the interests and objectives of EU, partner countries and migrants them-
selves. So, the partnership was included among the external migration policy’s instruments with 
additional and different features than its earlier namesakes of the Union’s external relations. Never-
theless, the need to contain the migratory pressure coming from Africa and the Mediterranean, an 
area in which the Union has recognized priority actions, affects the form and the content of the few 
partnerships concluded until now and has a negative impact on its results, as well as on the respect 
of fundamental rights of migrants.
KEY WORDS: EU external migration policy, Partnership, Mediterranean, Readmission Agree-
ment.
ALGUNAS BREVES REFLEXIONES SOBRE LA ASOCIACIÓN DE MOVILIDAD EN LA 
POLITICA DE LA UE EN MATERIA DE MIGRACIÓN EXTERIOR
RESUMEN: Este trabajo se centra en los aspectos más relevantes de las decisiones de política 
exterior de migración de la UE, mediante la Asociación de Movilidad que se propone como marco 
general para la gestión de los fl ujos migratorios procedentes de terceros países. Su objetivo princi-
pal era tener debidamente en cuenta los intereses y objetivos de la UE, los países socios y los pro-
pios migrantes. Es así que la cooperación se incluyó entre los instrumentos de política de migración 
externa con características nuevas y diferentes de sus antecedentes dentro de las relaciones externas 
de la Unión Europea. Sin embargo, la necesidad de contener la presión migratoria procedente de 
África y del Mediterráneo, área en la cual la Unión ha reconocido acciones prioritarias, infl uye en 
la forma y el contenido de pocas asociaciones hasta ahora llevadas a cabo, y posee una repercusión 
negativa en sus resultados, tal como en el respeto de los derechos básicos de los migrantes.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Política exterior de migración de la UE, Asociaciones de Movilidad, 
Mediterráneo, Acuerdo de readmisión
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QUELQUES BREFS REFLEXIONS SUR LE PARTENARIAT POUR LA MOBILITÉ 
DANS LA POLITIQUE MIGRATOIRE EXTÉRIEURE DE L’UE
RÉSUMÉ : Ce  travail se concentre sur les aspects les plus pertinents des choix de la politique 
migratoire extérieure de l’UE à travers l’instrument de partenariat de mobilité qui a été proposé 
comme cadre général pour la gestion des fl ux migratoires en provenance des pays tiers. Son princi-
pal objectif était de tenir dûment compte des intérêts et des objectifs de l’UE, les pays partenaires 
et les migrants eux-mêmes. Ainsi, le partenariat a été inclus parmi les instruments de la politique de 
migration externe avec des fonctionnalités supplémentaires et différentes que ses homonymes anté-
rieures de relations extérieures de l’Union. Néanmoins, la nécessité de contenir la pression migra-
toire en provenance d’Afrique et de la Méditerranée, un domaine dans lequel l’Union a reconnu les 
actions prioritaires, affecte la forme et le contenu des rares partenariats conclus jusqu’à présent et 
a un impact négatif sur ses résultats, ainsi que sur le respect des droits fondamentaux des migrants.
MOTS-CLÉS: Politique migratoire extérieure de l’UE, Partenariat, Méditerranée, Accord de réad-
mission.
I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS CONCERNING THE PARTNERSHIP INSTRUMENT
For a long time now some scholars no longer believe that the production 
of  international law is limited to classical sources. This is because of  their 
pluralization process. In fact these sources are multiple and different from 
those perceived in the classical conception of  international law because of  
the growing involvement in regulatory activity of  more actors besides States2. 
This means, on the one hand, a recourse to informality in the production 
of  international law and on the other hand, it causes a diversifi cation of  the 
means of  production of  its rules and, as a result, of  their content.3
In such a context we can include partnerships which, although in many 
cases coincide with the classical international treaty, in other cases show 
different connotations not perfectly coincident with the fi rst. Partnerships 
have therefore become a tool to foster cooperation and integration of  third 
countries and their citizens in the European Union, namely a framework within 
2 See D’ASPREMONT, J., (ed.), Participants in the International Legal System-Multiple Perspectives on 
Non-State Actors in International Law, Routledge, London, 2011. See also VON BOGDANDY, 
A., WOFRUM, R., VON BERNSTORFF, J., DANN, P., GOLDMANN, M. (eds.), The Exercise of  
Public Authority by International Institutions. Advancing International Institutional Law, Springer, 
Heidelberg, Dordrecht, London, New York, 2010, in particular pp. 3-32.
3 In this perspective, see D’ASPREMONT, J., Formalism and the sources of  International Law – 
A theory of  the Ascertainment of  Legal Rules, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011, who 
considers also that: ‘the idea that formal law-ascertainment has grown inappropriate to 
capture contemporary international norms has become even more prevalent’, p. 3. 
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which to include a further set of  binding and non-binding acts. They have 
also assumed a programmatic nature as part of  some specifi c external actions 
of  the Union4. Thus as part of  the EU external migration policy, partnerships 
were introduced as an instrument of  the so-called Global Approach for 
the regulation of  international relationships between the EU institutions, 
Member States and third countries, specifi cally identifi ed with reference to 
the migratory routes5. This instrument was also considered appropriate to 
embody a different approach aimed at involving all stakeholders, including 
migrants6. 
Accordingly, the present work precisely intends to highlight the most 
relevant aspects of  the choices of  the EU’s external migration policy through 
the main instrument, the Mobility Partnership, which gives substance to the 
so-called “partnership approach”7. In any case, additional existing instruments 
in the Union’s relations with third countries continue to “mingle” in order to 
contain the migratory pressure coming from Africa and the Mediterranean, 
an area in which the Union has recognized priority actions. As it will be seen, 
the Mobility Partnership is a non-binding instrument that refl ects the choices 
of  national policy of  the Member States which decide to participate. It is 
also closely linked to the readmission agreements which are the main legal 
instruments to contain the migratory masses, at the expense of  migrants’ 
rights8.
4 For more in-depth considerations, let us to refer to RUSSO, T., “Partnership as an 
Instrument of  Democratization in EU External Action: A Look at the Balkans”, in Law 
between Modernization and Tradition. Implications for the Legal, Political, Administrative and Public 
Order Organization, Hamangin, Bucharest, 2015, pp. 677-688. 
5 See URBANO DE SOUSA, C., “Le partenariat pour le mobilité: un instrument de l’approche 
globale en matière d’immigration, in DE BRUYCKER, P., FOBLETS, M.-C., MAES, M. (sous la 
direction), Dimension Externes du Droit et de la Politique d’immigration et d’Asile de l’UE, Bruylant, 
Brussels, 2011, pp. 343-358.
6 See the critical considerations on the protection of  migrants of  COLLYER, M., “Migrants 
as strategic actors in the European Union’s Global Approach to Migration and Mobility”, 
Global Networks, Vol. 12, No. 4, 2012, p. 505-524.
7 So KUNZ, R., “Governing International Migration through Partnership”, Third World 
Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 7, 2013, pp. 1227-1246.
8 In a critical view, see IPPOLITO, F. and TREVISANUT, S. (eds.), Migration in the Mediterranean. 
Mechanism of  International Cooperation,  Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015. 
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II. THE EXTERNAL DIMENSION OF EU MIGRATION POLICY
 AND THE “PARTNERSHIP APPROACH”
As it is known, the external dimension of  EU migration policy9 was 
developed only at a later time, that is when the abolition of  internal borders 
between EU Member States leads as a corollary the strengthening of  external 
borders, and therefore the need to create a common border management 
policy10. Similarly, the approach that is used by the Union is primarily directed 
to the externalization of  the European area of  freedom, security and justice 
with the adoption of  measures to combat illegal immigration11. Although in 
fact already with the Tampere programme, the European Council was aware 
of  the need to establish ‘a comprehensive approach to migration addressing 
political, human rights and development issues in countries and regions 
of  origin and transit’ and considered the partnership with third countries 
‘a key element for the success of  such a policy, with a view to promoting 
co-development’12, it is only since 2005 that the so-called “partnership 
approach” begins to materialize. It is so defi ned because based on ‘the belief  
9 According to RESLOW, N., Partnering for mobility? Three-level games in EU external migration policy, 
Datawyse bv, Maastricht, 2013, ‘External migration policy can be defi ned as a policy whereby 
third countries are drawn in to agreements, information exchanges, cooperation mechanisms 
or negotiations with the EU on migration issues’, p. 21.
10 This cooperation began in the Community area as early as 1985 when fi ve of  the ten 
countries that were at the time the Member States of  the EEC signed the Schengen 
Agreement, integrated, fi ve years later, by the implementing Convention. It is well known, 
then, how the Amsterdam Treaty and the subsequent implementing programmes since 1999 
have materialized and developed this objective. On the evolution of  the Union’s policy on 
immigration, see for all, CONDINANZI, M., LANG, A., NASCIMBENE, B., Citizenship of  the Union 
and free movement of  persons, Martinus Njihoff  Publishers, Leiden-Boston, 2008, in part. p. 201 
ff. 
11 From this moment, actions of  the Union direct to the creation of  an area of  freedom, 
security and justice tend gradually to strengthen its external dimension. However, compulsory 
measures regard illegal or irregular migration. See CARDWELL, P.J., “New Modes of  
Governance in the External Dimension of  EU Migration Policy”, International Migration, Vol. 
51, No. 6, 2013, pp. 55-66, who considers that curiously the strengthening of  the external 
dimension to FSJ in the Stockholm Programme was the provision of  ‘greater opportunities 
for EU citizens to work and do business with countries across the world’, p. 56.  
12 See Tampere European Council, A Common EU Asylum and Migration Policy, 15-16 October 
1999.
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that migration can be effectively managed in a spirit of  cooperation between 
all affected countries to yield win-win (including countries of  origin and 
destination) or win-win-win (also including migrants) solutions’13.
It is true that, in general, the EU’s migration policy has established itself  
with diffi culty. The phenomenon in question was always considered a highly 
sensitive matter for national sovereignty14 and, in any case, the subject of  
intergovernmental cooperation between States15. This explains how the same 
internal dimension has developed in small steps, starting as a sub-area of  
cooperation on justice and home affairs. It also explains how the external 
dimension16 has taken shape thanks to the need for integrating migration 
issues in the relationships with third countries for the EU enlargement policy, 
the European neighborhood policy17, or as a refl exion of  the Union’s internal 
competences18.
13 So, KUNZ, R.,  “Governing International Migration”, cit. p. 1233 who considers that 
partnership is not a mere political tool, but an essential element of  the governance of  
international migration.
14 See RESLOW, A., “Deciding on EU External Migration Policy: The Member States and the 
Mobility Partnership”, Journal of  European Integration, Vol. 34, No. 3, 2012, pp. 223-239. 
15 An example is given by the Budapest Process that is a consultative forum of  more than fi fty 
governments (including Western Balkans, China, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, 
Iraq, Syria, Turkey and the countries of  Central Asia) and various international organisations 
based on exchanging information and best practices on a wide range of  migration issues. 
It started in 1991 as one of  the longest standing cooperation framework on migration 
for Europe and its Eastern neighbours. Thanks to the Budapest Process, the Silk Route 
Partnership for Migration was established at the Ministerial Conference held in Istanbul on 
19 April 2013 to improve cooperation in the area of  migration between the countries of  
the Budapest Process and the Silk Route countries (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iran, Iraq and 
Pakistan).
16 See WEINAR, A., EU Cooperation Challenges in External Migration Policy, EU-US Immigration 
Systems, 2011/02, Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, San Domenico di Fiesole 
(FI): European University Institute, 2011, who considers the external dimension of  migration 
policy ‘a matrix of  tension between priorities and competences at the supranational and 
national levels’.
17 So, for example, thanks to migration and readmission clauses included in international 
agreements of  association and cooperation. See EISELE, K., The External Dimension of  the 
EU’s Migration Policy. Different Legal Positions of  Third-Country Nationals in the EU: A Comparative 
Perspective¸ Brill-Nijhoff, Leiden, 2014.
18 According to RESLOW, N., “An Incompetent Actor? Assessing EU External Migration 
Policy”, European Foreign Affairs Review, Vol. 20, No. 4, 2015, pp. 471-494, ‘Legal competence 
Some Brief  Refl ections Concerning the Mobility Partnership in the EU External Migratrion Policy
Paix et Securité Internationales
ISSN 2341-0868, Num. 4, janvier-décembre 2016, pp. 93-10998
Even after the Lisbon Treaty, the Union’s external competence in this 
fi eld is conventionally limited to readmission agreements provided for in 
Article 79.3 TFEU, the visa agreements based on Article 77 TFEU, as well as 
to the ‘partnership and cooperation with third countries for the purpose of  
managing infl ows of  people applying for asylum or subsidiary or temporary 
protection’ (Article 78.2, letter. g). Furthermore Member States retain the 
right to determine volumes of  admission of  third countries’ citizens on their 
territory in order to fi nd work (Article 79.5 TFEU)19. However, there has 
been a radical change from the point of  view of  policy choices underlying 
on external migration policy is, however, also derived from internal competences in the fi eld 
of  justice and home affairs’, as well as she considers that the adoption of  measures within 
the EU ‘based on internal competence on migration can have signifi cant external effects’, in 
part. p. 478.
19  As well known, the EU migration policy should be governed by the principle of  
solidarity and fair sharing of  responsibility, including its fi nancial implications, between the 
Member States (Article 80 TFEU). In the view of  the achievement of  the EU objectives 
provided in Article 79 TFEU (legal immigration, integration of  migrants, fi ght against illegal 
immigration, fi ght against traffi cking in human beings, etc.) a number of  important directives 
relating to immigration and asylum have been adopted. According to MARTENCZUK, B., 
“Migration Policy and EU External Relations”, in AZOULAI, L. and DE VRIES, K. (eds.), EU 
Migration Law. Legal Complexities and Political Rationales, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2014, the EU external migration policy consists of  ‘all policies affecting the movement of  
TCNs across the EU’s external border’, p. 69 ff. These are, for example, the Council Directive 
2009/50/EC of  25 May 2009 on the conditions of  entry and residence of  third-country nationals for the 
purposes of  highly qualifi ed employment (OJ L 155, 18.6.2009, pp. 17–29); the Directive 2011/98/
EU of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  13 December 2011 on a single application procedure 
for a single permit for third-country nationals to reside and work in the territory of  a Member State and on a 
common set of  rights for third-country workers legally residing in a Member State (OJ L 343, 23.12.2011, 
pp. 1–9); Directive 2014/36/EU of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  26 February 2014 
on the conditions of  entry and stay of  third-country nationals for the purpose of  employment as seasonal 
workers (OJ L 94, 28.3.2014, pp. 375–390); Directive 2014/66/EU of  the European Parliament 
and of  the Council of  15 May 2014 on the conditions of  entry and residence of  third-country nationals in 
the framework of  an intra-corporate transfer (OJ L 157, 27.5.2014, pp. 1–22, it is to be transposed 
by 29 November 2016), as well as the Council Directive 2003/86/EC of  22 September 2003 on 
the Right to Family Reunifi cation (OJ L. 251/12-251/18); Directive 2008/115/EC of  the European 
Parliament and of  the Council of  16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member 
States for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ L. 348/98-348/107; 16.12.2008); 
Directive 2009/52/EC of  the European Parliament and of  the Council of  18 June 2009 providing for 
minimum standards on sanctions and measures against employers of  illegally staying third-country nationals. 
For a comprehensive overview of  the relevant EU legislation, see for all HAILBRONNER, K. 
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the external dimension of  migration20. As a result of  the changing scenario 
of  international migration, the European Union also expressed the need to 
change its approach to migration through the strategy on the Global Approach 
to Migration promoted by the European Council in December 2005, focusing 
on partnership and dialogue with non-EU countries21. This approach, which 
aimed at incorporating the opportunities of  legal migration in the external 
policies of  the Union, was then translated into a series of  policy proposals 
of  the Commission that since 2007 seeks to promote, at the occurrence of  
certain conditions, the opportunities of  legal migration for the citizens of  
third countries in order to discourage illegal migrations22. Therefore in 2011 
the Commission adopted a renewed Global Approach in the Communication 
on Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM)23, which includes mobility 
as a much broader concept than migration24.
This renewed approach establishes a general framework for the EU’s 
relations with third countries in the fi eld of  migration, namely an overarching 
framework of  EU external migration policy, complementary to EU foreign 
policy and development cooperation. Based on four pillars, (legal immigration 
and mobility, illegal immigration and traffi cking in human beings, international 
protection and asylum policy, and maximising the impact of  migration and 
mobility on development) it was implemented not only through the classic 
legal instruments previously mentioned, but also through a number of  policy 
instruments, including the Mobility Partnership, already considered ‘as the 
main strategic, comprehensive and long-term cooperation framework for 
and THYM, D. (eds.), EU immigration and asylum law. Commentary, 2nd edition, C.H. Beck/
Hart/Nomos, München, Oxford, Baden-Baden, 2016. 
20 See NASCIMBENE, B., “The Global Approach to Migration: European Union Policy in the 
Light of  the Implementation of  the Hague Programme”, ERA Forum, Vol. 9, No. 2, 2008, 
pp. 291-300. 
21 See European Council Global Approach to Migration: Priority actions focusing on Africa and the 
Mediterranean, 13 December 2005, 15744/05. This was completed in its conclusions on the 
development of  a Comprehensive European Migration Policy of  December 2006, 16879/1/06 
REV 1.
22 See European Commission On circular migration and mobility partnerships between the European 
Union and third countries, 16 May 2007, COM(2007) 248 fi nal. 
23 See 18 November 2011, COM(2011) 743 fi nal.
24 In a critical view, see RESLOW, N., “An Incompetent Actor”, cit., p. 482 ff.
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migration management with third countries, adding value to existing bilateral 
frameworks’25.
III. THE MOBILITY PARTNERSHIP: LEGAL FORM AND CONTENTS
The Mobility Partnership is the name that the Commission proposed to 
give to the mobility packages as a general framework for the management of  
migration fl ows from third countries while bringing together the ‘possibilities 
offered by the Member States and the European Community, while fully 
respecting the division of  competences as provided by the Treaty’26. This 
Partnership was born with many purposes: organizing a package of  mutual 
commitments and offers of  project initiatives covering mobility, migration 
and asylum issues, adapted to the specifi c requirements of  EU Member 
States in terms of  the labor market; seeking to secure easier access to EU 
territory for the citizens of  third countries; facilitating circular and temporary 
migration in order to help the EU Member States to respond to the needs 
of  their labor market and use the potential positive impact of  migration 
for their development; responding to the needs of  countries of  origin with 
regard to skills transfer and mitigating the effects of  brain drain. Therefore, 
its main aim was to take due account of  the interests and objectives of  EU, 
partner countries and migrants themselves27. In this sense, this instrument 
was deemed to be able to turn into responsible partners, not only the third 
States willing to cooperate with the Union to share common interests, mutual 
benefi ts and shared responsibility, but also the migrants themselves in as 
much as informed, assisted and encouraged to collaborate also for their 
repatriation28.
As a result, the partnership was included among the external migration 
policy’s instruments with additional and different features than its earlier 
25 European Council The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting 
the citizens, 2 December 2009, 17024/09, paragraph 6.1.1, p. 61. 
26 See European Commission The Global Approach to Migration one year on: Towards a comprehensive 
European migration policy, 30 November 2011, COM(2006) 735 fi nal. 
27 The human rights of  migrants are in fact a cross-cutting issue in this approach.
28 So KUNZ, R., “Governing International Migration”, cit. p. 1240 who, in general, considers 
that thanks to the partnership approach also migrants are turned in partners, not only in 
development, but also in return policy making.
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namesakes of  the Union’s external relations. So much so that the Commission 
took care to defi ne the legal nature, form and content, concluding that it is 
impossible to list all the components of  a Mobility Partnership. It presents 
itself  as a kind of  policy coordination29 that is characterized by its wide 
differentiation both as regards with the participating Member States and 
its contents. In fact, such contents are affected by other Union’s external 
relations with third countries involved, as well as ‘they are tailored to the 
specifi cs of  each relevant third country, to the ambitions of  the country 
concerned and of  the EU, and to the level of  commitments which the third 
country is ready to take on in terms of  action against illegal migration and 
facilitating reintegration of  returnees, including efforts to provide returnees 
with employment opportunities’30. Even more, these partnerships depend 
on Member States’ national laws concerning the admission of  third-country 
citizens, as well as their political constraints and priorities. However, they are 
constructed on the basis of  a common element, the “joint responsibility” 
between partners.
For all these reasons, the mobility partnership is one of  the fl exible 
instruments31 that lack a legal defi nition and it is alternative to those binding 
to achieve the objectives of  the external governance of  the Union’s migration 
policy32. By express provision of  the Commission33, it has a complex legal 
nature. In fact it involves many elements, some of  the Union’s competence, 
others of  the Member States’ competence. It is namely a framework 
established by a ‘joint political declaration between the EU and interested 
Member States, on the one hand, and the partner country on the other, based 
29 See PARKER, R., “EU Mobility Partnership: A model of  Policy Coordination?”, European 
Journal of  Migration and Law, Vol. 11, No. 4, pp. 327-345. 
30 See European Commission On circular migration and mobility partnerships, cit., p. 4. 
31 There are several political instruments, such as bilateral and regional policy dialogues and 
action plans between countries of  origin, transit and destination, according to specifi cally 
geographical priorities in line with the reality of  migration trends, as well as migration profi le, 
migration missions, etc.
32 See CARDWELL, P.J., “New Modes of  Governance”, cit., p. 57.
33 See Mobility partnership as a tool of  the Global Approach to Migration, 18 September 2009, 
SEC(2009)1240 fi nal, who considers the mobility partnership as ‘the most innovative 
tool to date of  the Global Approach to Migration and contribute signifi cantly to its 
operationalization’, paragraph 4. 
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on mutual commitments, but formally non-binding’34. More specifi cally, it 
takes ‘the form of  political statements (declarations of  intention) signed by 
the Community, the Presidency of  the EU, interested Member States and 
respective partner third country’. It is formulated in non-binding terms, to 
be adapted according to the current needs35. It is an umbrella under which 
partners can implement not only cooperation initiatives, but also can negotiate 
and conclude bilateral agreements, albeit mainly on readmission in the event 
of  illegal immigration36.
Certainly, in the face of  numerous attempts to give a defi nition37, it seems 
that the most signifi cant features of  the Mobility Partnership could be its 
non-binding nature, the will of  the Member States to take part of  it, as well 
as its purpose to compose or combine the interests of  the institutions of  
the Union, of  third countries and above all of  the Member States. In other 
words, it seems to be a regulatory framework which has the purpose to ensure 
that movements of  persons between the EU and a partner country are well-
governed. Indeed, a Mobility Partnership should be presented once a certain 
level of  progress has been achieved in the migration and mobility dialogues, 
also taking into consideration the broader economic, political and security 
context. Moreover, the mobility partnership offers visa facilitation based 
on a simultaneously negotiated readmission agreement. The composition 
of  these interests, thought of  as one of  the main objectives of  partnership, 
would have to minimize tensions in the EU’s external migration policy. On 
the contrary, the existing diversities, in addition to affecting the form and the 
34 See CARRERA, S., HERNÁNDEZ I SAGRERA, R., “Mobility Partnerships ‘Insecurity Partnership’ 
for policy coherence and migrant workers’ human rights in the EU”, in KUNZ, R., LAVENEX, 
S., PANIZZON, M. (eds.), Multilayered Migration Governance. The promise of  partnership, Routledge, 
London and New York, 2011, p. 97 ff. 
35 It is a “living document” in the thought of   BROCZA, S. and PAULHART, K, “EU mobility 
partnerships: a smart instrument for the externalization of  migration control”, Eur J Futures 
Res, No. 3, 2015. 
36 See WIESBROCK, A., “Euro-Mediterranean Labour Migration: a mutually benefi cial 
partnership?”, in IPPOLITO, F., and TREVISANUT, S. (eds.), Migration in the Mediterranean, cit., who 
considers that the Mobility Partnership with Morocco and Tunisia shows a clear emphasis on 
migration control, readmission and return and only minimally improved opportunities for 
legal migration and employment, p. 175.  
37 For a reconstruction on the topic of  Mobility Partnership, see RESLOW, N., “Partnering for 
mobility?”, cit., p. 21 ff.
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content of  the few partnerships concluded until now, have a negative impact 
on cooperation hindering, at least for the moment, the envisioned results.
IV. THE PRIORITY GIVEN TO AFRICA AND THE MEDITERRANEAN
The priorities to respond to migration-related challenges are, as it is 
known, identifi ed by the Council38 and, therefore, by the Commission39 in its 
proposals to promote the management of   migration fl ows of  people from 
Africa and the Mediterranean. Notoriously, these areas are the scene of  death 
for thousands of  migrants/refugees in transit to reach the Union. Following 
the approach outlined above, the tools used were those of  political dialogue, 
both at regional and multilateral levels since immediate Southern neighbours, 
and bilaterally with key countries of  origin and transit of  migration fl ows 
or, anyway, coming within the migratory routes. These are precisely the 
third States with which to conclude Mobility Partnerships. The two areas in 
question are interconnected and overlapping not only from a geographical 
point of  view, but also in the context of  the Union’s policies. In fact, they are 
also the subject of  the European neighbourhood policy and fall within the 
Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean, that 
is to say other frameworks within which to manage both bilateral and regional 
relations40.
38 See European Council Global approach to migration, cit., p. 3, where it states that ‘Action must 
be taken to reduce illegal migration fl ows and the loss of  lives, ensure safe return of  illegal 
migrants, strengthen durable solutions for refugees, and build capacity to better manage 
migration, including through maximising the benefi ts to all partners of  legal migration, while 
fully respecting human rights and the individual’s right to seek asylum. The immediate actions 
set out below form part of  a broader agenda for developing the EU’s relationship with Africa 
and the Mediterranean countries through genuine partnership. The European Council also 
welcomes the complementary dialogue and cooperation being pursued by Member States in 
this area’.
39 See European Commission Priority actions for responding to the challenges of  migration: fi rst follow-
up to Hampton Court, 30 November 2005, COM(2005) 621 fi nal.
40 See European Commission Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy, 4 December 2016, 
COM(2006)726 fi nal that considers that: ‘these mobility partnerships would form part of  the 
actions envisaged to strengthen the European Neighbourhood Policy’.
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As a new initiative that is part of  the highlighted “partnership approach”, 
the EU-Africa Partnership on Migration, Mobility and Employment41 is a 
continental Partnership between the EU and all African States which aims to 
provide comprehensive responses to migration, in the interest of  all partners. 
The particular focus of  this partnership is that of  facilitating mobility and 
free movement of  people in Africa and within the EU; better managing legal 
migration between the two continents, addressing the root causes of  migration 
and refugee fl ows; ensuring fair treatment of  all migrants under applicable 
international law; fi nding concrete solutions to problems posed by irregular 
migration fl ows and traffi cking of  human beings; ensuring that migration and 
mobility work for development42. At a sub-regional level, some examples are 
the Rabat process which consists of  policy dialogues with countries along 
the Western migratory route43, as well as the Khartoum Process that was 
launched at a Ministerial Conference in November 2014 in Rome to establish 
a long-standing dialogue on migration and mobility44.
At a bilateral level, although the mobility partnership had started with 
several countries of  the region, it has taken shape with only a few countries 
(Cape Verde, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan). Instead with other countries (Ethiopia 
41 See LAVENEX, S., “Interregionalism in the EU External Migration Policies”, in TELÒ, M., 
FAWCETT, L., PONJAERT, F. (eds.), Interregionalism and the European Union. A Post-Revisionist 
Approach to Europe’s Place in a Changing World, Routledge, London and New York, 2015, pp. 
159-174, in part. p. 169. 
42 It is informed by the Joint Africa-EU Strategy agreed in Lisbon in December 2007, 
as well as the Declaration of  the 2006 Tripoli Ministerial Conference on Migration and 
Development, and the Ouagadougou EU-Africa Plan of  Action on Traffi cking in Human 
Beings, especially Women and Children. 
43 It was launched at the fi rst Euro-African Ministerial Conference on Migration and 
Development in July 2006 in Rabat. It brings together governments of  European and African 
countries from North, West and Central Africa, together with the European Commission 
and the Economic Community of  West African States (ECOWAS). Its aims are: to enhance 
dialogue and cooperation on legal migration and mobility; prevention of  irregular migration 
and measures to counteract it; migration and development; international protection. 
44 The Khartoum Process is led by a Steering Committee of  fi ve EU Member States (Italy, 
France, Germany, UK, Malta), fi ve partner countries (Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, South Sudan, 
Sudan) as well as the European Commission, the European External Action Service and the 
AU Commission.
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and Nigeria) the Common Agenda on Migration and Mobility tool (CAMM)45 
has been used. According to some scholars, the conditional link between 
mobility partnerships and cooperation on readmission46 does not correspond 
to the main interest of  the African countries. These, indeed, would be more 
interested in promoting their development and then the connection between 
migration and development47. Conversely, the debate concerning migration 
and development would be characterized by the ‘overwhelming presence 
of  the security rationale’48. As pointed out, cooperation on readmission has 
45 According to the Commission (see note 22), the Common Agenda is a political instrument 
‘for partner countries and for the EU and its Member States in cases where both sides 
want to establish an advanced level of  cooperation, but where one side or the other is not 
ready to enter into the full set of  obligations and commitments. Like the MP, the CAMM 
should set a number of  common recommendations, targets and commitments for dialogue 
and cooperation and should include a package of  specifi c support measures offered by the 
EU and interested Member States. If  both parties agree, the Common Agenda could be 
upgraded to a Mobility Partnership at a later stage. It does not include the negotiation of  
visa facilitation and readmission agreements, and it should mainly be used for other third 
countries’. 
46 See CASSARINO, J.P., Readmission Policy in the European Union, Bruxelles: European Parliament, 
2010, who considers that: ‘the EU’s attempt to link mobility partnerships with cooperation 
on readmission refl ects how this issue has become a central component of  its immigration 
policy’, p. 36. 
47 See CHOU, M.-H., EU and the Migration-Development Nexus: What Prospects for EU-Wide 
Policies?, Working Paper, No. 37, University of  Oxford, 2006. 
48 So CHOU, M.-H., European Migration Strategy towards West Africa: the Origin and Outlook 
of  ‘Mobility Partnership’ with Cape Verde and Senegal, 2009, available on <http://aei.pitt.
edu/33039/1/chou._meng-hsuan.pdf>. The readmission agreements ask in fact their 
partners to readmit, not only their own citizens, even other States’ citizens who passed 
through their territory to reach Europe. Furthermore, the connection between readmission 
and visa facilitation agreements is not an automatic connection. See Council of  the EU, 
Common approach on visa facilitation, 16030/05, Brussel, 21 December 2005, who considers that: 
‘However, the existence of  a readmission agreement, or the willingness of  a third-country 
to negotiate one, does not automatically nor routinely lead to the opening of  negotiations 
on a visa facilitation agreement. The EU shall consider making use of  other instruments 
to achieve the conclusion and implementation of  a readmission agreement, e.g. political, 
economic,  commercial or development policy related’.
Some Brief  Refl ections Concerning the Mobility Partnership in the EU External Migratrion Policy
Paix et Securité Internationales
ISSN 2341-0868, Num. 4, janvier-décembre 2016, pp. 93-109106
been perceived as succumbing to foreign infl uence, and not as a developing 
country’s own policy 49.
It is true that in the Commission’s view the establishment of  a mobility 
partnership can take place ‘once certain conditions have been met, such as 
cooperation on illegal migration and effective mechanisms for readmission’50. 
Both partnerships with Jordan and with Morocco provide, for example, in 
the section on implementation, that: ‘The signatory parties take the view that 
the elements contained in the various components of  this partnership will 
be implemented using a balanced overall approach and constitute a package, 
particularly the visa and readmission facilitation agreements, which shall be 
concluded simultaneously’51. Such a connection has been criticized, on the 
one hand, because it would continue to confi rm the traditional conception 
of  migration as insecurity 52. On the other hand, because it entails the risk of  
violation of  international obligations relating to fundamental rights53, such 
as the right to non-refoulement or the right of  every person to seek asylum 
and to leave their own country, as well as the risk of  collective refoulements54. 
49 So WEINAR, A., “EU cooperation challenges”, cit., p. 7. Sub-Saharan African countries are 
interested in the access to EU labour markets and North African countries consider transit 
migration an European issue the effects of  which they have to put up with. 
50 See European Commission The Global Approach to migration one year on, mentioned above 
note 25. 
51 See the Joint declaration establishing a Mobility Partnership between the Hashemite 
Kingdom of  Jordan and the European Union and its participating Member States, paragraph 
33 e the Joint declaration establishing a Mobility Partnership between the Kingdom of  
Morocco and the European Union and its Member States, paragraph 39. 
52 See CARRERA, S., The EU’s Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security with the Southern 
Mediterranean. Filling the Gaps in the Global Approach to Migration, June 2011, available on 
<http://aei.pitt.edu/32071/1/No_41_Carrera_on_EU_Dialogue_with_SoMed_edited_
fi nal-1.pdf>, p. 5.
53 See the Analysis of  the Mobility Partnership signed between the Kindgom of  Morocco, the 
European Union and nine Member States on 7 June 2013 edited by the Euro-Mediterranean 
Human Rights Network, February 2014, available on <http://euromedrights.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/03/PM-Morocco_Final-Version-EN.pdf>. See also the Focus 
of  Asylum and migration into the EU in 2015 edited by the European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights, 2016.
54 It is well known that the automatism in the refoulement of  asylum-seekers without any 
assessment of  the respect of  fundamental rights was condemned by the European Court of  
Human Rights also with reference to the so-called Dublin system (on the reform proposal, 
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This fact undermines an approach centered on the respect of  migrants’ rights 
that is the basis of  the very structure of  the Mobility Partnership55.
V. CONCLUSIONS: WHAT RESULTS?
In conclusion, it is clear that the success of  the Union’s migration policy 
depends on its external dimension, namely on the regulation of  its relations 
with third countries of  origin and transit of  such migratory fl ows that in 
recent years have tried to reach Europe. However, it is equally clear that, 
in the context of  a still “experimental” phase, the proposed new approach 
encounters several obstacles caused by the shared competence of  Member 
States (Article 4.2, lett. j TFEU). These limit the power of  initiative of  the 
Commission and continue to propose individual projects demonstrating a 
preference for bilateral cooperation. Moreover, Member States are free to 
participate in the mobility partnership and take part only if  it is in line with 
their national policy. Apart from France which is present in all the partnerships, 
in other cases the number of  participating States is highly variable.
Furthermore, we cannot fail to mention the different approach followed 
by the two main institutions involved: the Council and the Commission. The 
former has shown a greater propensity to frame migration in the foreign 
policy, the latter more inclined to offer incentives to third countries with the 
aim of  improving cooperation56. Even the choice of  a typically non-binding 
see CAGGIANO, G., “Prime rifl essioni sulle proposte di riforma del sistema europeo comune 
d’asilo in materia di qualifi che, procedure e accoglienza”, SIDIBlog of  3rd October 2016, 
available on http://www.sidiblog.org). See ex multis ECtHR, Sharifi  and Others v. Italy and 
Greece (no. 16643/09), 21 October 2014. Similarly, any automatic provision on readmission 
included in agreements gives rise to doubts about their legitimacy, such as in the case of  
Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of  Turkey on the readmission 
of  persons residing without authorisation (OJ L 134, 7.5.2014, pp. 3–27) that was concluded 
by the Council Decision 2014/252/EU (OJ L134/17.05.2014) and entered into force on 
1st October 2014. On 18 March 2016, the European Union and Turkey decided to end the 
irregular migration from Turkey to the EU, because of  some debatable principles contained 
in the EU-Turkey statement of  7 March 2016. See FAVILLI, C., “La cooperazione UE-Turchia 
per contenere il fl usso dei migranti e richiedenti asilo: obiettivo riuscito?”, Diritti umani e diritto 
internazionale, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2016, pp. 405-426. 
55 See CARRERA, S., The EU’s Dialogue on Migration, Mobility and Security with the Southern 
Mediterranean, cit.
56 See RESLOW, A., “Deciding on EU External Migration Policy”, cit. p. 225.
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instrument is relevant in this sense. It also makes marginal, if  not non-existent, 
the role of  the European Parliament and excludes the jurisdiction of  the 
Court of  Justice. For this reason some have affi rmed the need to translate the 
mobility partnerships in international agreements, similar to those used in the 
context of  readmission and asylum cooperation57. Apart from the fact that 
such a solution would lead to the change of  the approach that was intended 
to usher in with this tool58, it would have the effect of  bargaining for the 
signature of  the agreement with the addition of  delays in the ratifi cation 
process. Although outside of  this context, one example is the readmission 
agreement with Turkey. The negotiations were very long because of  the fact 
that Turkey requested as a precondition a road map for visa liberalization for 
its nationals.
Therefore, the results obtained can be evaluated both quantitatively 
and qualitatively. In the fi rst sense, there has been a proliferation of  policy 
documents which, perhaps for the need to explain this new approach of  the 
EU external migration policy, have made its objectives too much overlapped 
and unclear. In the same perspective, the bilateral relations between the 
EU Member States and third countries continue to prevail quantitatively, 
thus belittling the “competence” of  the Union in the fi eld. Furthermore, 
the predominant role of  the Council and the Member States “decreases” 
or diminishes the power of  the Commission. Finally, in the implementation 
process of  the Mobility Partnership ‘the approach of  restricting immigration 
and maximizing the effi ciency of  readmission’ has prevailed59. From the 
second point of  view, conversely, although the intention was to qualitatively 
improve the Union’s external relations on migration issues, precisely in a spirit 
57 See CARRERA, S., The EU’s Dialogue, cit., who recommends that: ‘Despite comprising a central 
plank of  the EU’s response to events in the Southern Mediterranean, Mobility Partnerships 
reveal defi cits when tested against principles of  legal certainty, democratic accountability and 
international labour and human rights standards’, p. 24. See also CARRERA, S. and HERNÁNDEZ 
I SAGRERA, R., “The externalisation of  the EU’s Labour Immigration Policy. Towards Mobility 
or Insecurity Partnership?”, CEPS Working Document, No. 321, 2009.
58 See KUNZ, R., “Governing International Migration”, cit. p. 1241 who considers that 
“partnership approach” creates new states and migrant subjectivities in a ‘(quasi-)contractual 
joint agreements of  mutual commitments’. 
59 According to MAISENBACHER, J., “The Political Economy of  Mobility Partnership – 
Structural Power in the EU’s External Migration Policy”, New Political Economy, Vol. 20, No. 
6, 2015, pp. 871-893, market forces infl uence EU external migration policy.
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of  partnership with shared responsibilities, the balance seems to be skewed 
in favor of  the needs of  Member States with obvious risks for the respect 
of  fundamental rights of  migrants. In conclusion, the “ostensible” reduction 
of  the registered migratory pressure60 is more a result of  the change of  the 
selected migratory routes61 or of  all migrants left outside Europe that an 
outcome to be attributed to this new approach.
60 See UNHCR data available on <http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/regional.php>.
61 See Europe/Mediterranean - Migration Crisis Response Situation Report of  the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), 7 September 2016, available on <https://www.iom.int/
sites/default/fi les/situation_reports/fi le/IOM-Med-Migration-Crisis-Response-Sitrep-07-
September-2016.pdf>. 
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